NK Investigative Report 2001

When is North Korea Going to Open Up?

from Chapter 1 of "Re-examining North Korea Missions" by David Lee, download entire thesis (185k, pdf)

D. The Uncertainty of Change

The final obstacle to mission efforts is the uncertainty of change that surrounds North Korea. Nobody knows when or if the government will loosen control over religion. In fact, as the economy worsens, the situation in North Korea becomes increasingly unpredictable. Thus, for those involved in North Korea mission work the task of planning is extremely difficult. The dilemma is whether to wait until the government loosens control over religion to push forth with mission work, or to go ahead with mission efforts that might risk the lives of many foreign missionaries and North Korean church members. In order to understand this uncertainty that surrounds the regime in North Korea, four scenarios for change will be examined: no change, reform, militaristic reunification, and voluntary collapse. In each scenario, the writer will show its plausible sequence, the factors supporting it, and the possible peninsula outcomes.

1. No Change

The first possible scenario for the North Korea regime to follow is that of no change. In this scenario, the Kim Jong Il regime continues its totalitarian rule by crushing all opponents and critics of the government. Kim Jong Il upholds the Juche philosophy in all aspects of government, and there is little change in economic, political, or social policies. Perhaps North Korea enters into better relations with China and Russia, resuming the relationship that upheld North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s and thus alleviating the chronic shortages of food. On the peninsula, the antagonistic relationship with South Korea is perpetuated with large armies showcased.

Though many North Korea observers state that the regime will be forced to make changes in the near future, it is plausible that the North Korea regime shuns change altogether. First, the North Korea regime is somewhat successful in rejecting change so far. Kim Jong Il continues his purges of the government and no signs of protests or demonstrations are visible anywhere in the country. Furthermore, the fact that the regime is holding out despite large numbers of people starving to death speaks to the present confidence of the regime. The current North Korea regime has outlived the expectations of most observers, and it is possible that it could continue to do so. Russian experts note, "the political system of the DPRK may survive for a long time, no matter how unjust, illogical, or simply strange it might seem to outsiders," as in the case of Libya, Iraq, and Myanmar.

In the case where the North Korea regime follows a "no change" policy, several outcomes for the Korea peninsula are possible. First, it is clearly possible that North Korea continues in its current state for many years to come. North Korea's ailing economy can be restored from aid and resumed trade with China, and perhaps Russia or the Middle East. In this case, the North Korea mission effort will face a tremendous obstacle in accessing the country for many years to come. We must also consider a perpetual state of this regime where Kim Jong Il selects a successor and successfully transfers leadership in the future. In this outcome, reunification and the loosening of the government's control over religion is bleak over the next forty to fifty years. Another possible outcome of the "no change" scenario is sudden collapse of the regime. After resisting change the Kim Jong Il regime could suddenly collapse via a coup or the willing surrender of the government. In this case, the collapse would be sudden since no previous signs of change would be visible. Chaos would reign in the Korea peninsula as scenarios for rapid absorption or gradual reunification would be examined. Freedom of religion would be instantly granted, leading to a rush of religious groups entering the country, including cults. However, in the case where border movements are restricted, it is uncertain if South Korean religious groups will be free to enter North Korea.

2. Reform

Another possible scenario in the case of the North Korea regime is one of reform. In this scenario Pyongyang follows the advice of China and opens its economy, albeit slowly, to international trade and foreign investment. The regime opens new special economic zones aimed at encouraging export growth and technology transfer. North Korea then follows the example of China in allowing limited political change over a long period. People in North Korea are given limited religious freedom. The economy improves over the years, thus alleviating the food crisis of its past. Economic integration with the South may move toward rapprochement with unification many years down the road.

Several factors contribute to making this scenario highly possible. First, Kim Jong Il might have no other choice but to implement reforms. Amos Jordan notes, "only a massive infusion of relief aid and economic assistance can sustain the regime in the short and mid-term; only deep economic reforms, coupled with continuing economic aid, can sustain it in the long-term." In fact, signs that the elite are becoming critical of Kim Jong Il are becoming more visible. Thus, it is likely that the DPRK will sooner or later embark on reforms, or else at some point his associates will likely topple or exterminate him. Another factor that gives credibility to this scenario is that some believe that the foremost goal of the North Korea regime is national survival, not the forceful domination of the South. These "optimists" believe Pyongyang is gradually trying to end its isolation and is beginning to engage the outside world. However, some note that reforms mean the end of the Kim Jong Il regime. CNN reports:

But Kim Jong Il still faces a fundamental dilemna. To revive his ruined economy and rescue his people from hunger, Kim needs to begin reforms, which, by opening the country and introducing elements of the market, could spell the end to his regime.

Most Russian observers think Kim Jong Il is simply scared to launch reforms because he remembers the fate of communist reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, North Korea's deteriorating economy might give enough incentive for Kim Jong Il to initiate change.

In a scenario of reform several outcomes on the Korean peninsula are possible. First, the reforms that Kim Jong Il implements could be successful and follow the case of China. As the economy and government slowly open to change, religion will be increasingly tolerated. This would probably lead to a government-sanctioned church, much like the 3-Self Church in China. However, Kim Jong Il would retain control and mediate change. Second, as Kim Jong Il implements reforms he could be toppled by a coup d'etat. Those in the North Korea military dissatisfied with an "opening to the West" policy could seize power in the name of Kim Il Sung's legacy. In another case, technocrats together with the elite and military could take over the government in an effort to improve conditions in the country if Kim Jong Il's reforms are not successful. North Korea could return to the totalitarian Juche state of government, which is admittedly unlikely, or the government could open up, leading to eventual reunification. All in all, if Kim Jong Il implements reform the most likely outcome is for North Korea to follow the example of China. In this case, mission efforts must have a long-term mission strategy to work within a communist country and with a government-sanctioned church.

3. Militaristic Reunification

A third possible scenario for the North Korea regime to follow is one of militaristic reunification. In this scenario, Kim Jong Il, realizing that his country is doomed, decides to make a drastic move to salvage his government. North Korea threatens to deploy nuclear weapons over Seoul and Tokyo unless the United States backs out and Seoul agrees to reunification on equal terms. North Korea and South Korea enter into a confederation with two states and two governments, eventually leading to a unified country.

Several factors make a militaristic reunification scenario plausible. First, reunification, according to Kim Jong Il, is North Korea's greatest national task. He states:

We must achieve the country's reunification, the lifelong will of respected comrade Kim Il Sung and the vital demand of the nation. National reunification is the greatest national task that must not be delayed any longer.

In the case where North Korea faces imminent doom, Kim Jong Il likely will pursue reunification by force as a last option. Second, the status of the military continues to elevate in North Korea's power structure. In September, 1998, a constitutional revision created an omnipotent National Defense Commission, now defined as the nation's most powerful organ, with Kim Jong Il in the new position of chairman. The Economist notes, "Mr. Kim is increasingly surrounding himself with military hardliners... this gives the impression that the North will be run more like a military state, and one in a state of emergency." Kim Jong Il might be tempted into a military option as he increasingly becomes dependent on the army for power. Third, militaristic reunification might appeal as the best-case scenario to the North Korea regime. Rather than being absorbed into South Korea-in the process facing extreme humiliation-North Korea would likely opt for a two-state confederation, even if the means was nuclear blackmail.
The outcome of a militaristic reunification effort by North Korea would be marked by sudden, severe change. If successful, North Korea would almost instantaneously enter a confederation with the South, and the process of reunification would begin. Reunification would take the world by surprise. Mission agencies would find many obstacles of access removed, and depending on how well prepared for such a situation mission groups are, missionaries would enter the North in large numbers. If militaristic reunification ends unsuccessfully, it is possible that North Korea could deploy nuclear weapons, supposing they possessed them, and Seoul and Tokyo would be devastated. Following this, the North Korea regime would collapse immediately or after a military standoff. Mission groups will be faced with a twin-towered task of cleaning up after a nuclear holocaust in South Korea and ministering to a famine-stricken society recovering from a totalitarian collapse of the government in North Korea.

4. Voluntary Collapse

The last likely scenario for the North Korea regime is one of voluntary collapse. In this scenario, Kim Jong Il, rather than trying to save Juche or his government, officially announces that Juche is a failure, and awaits absorption of the North by the South. A period of chaos and disorder is followed by meetings between the two governments to facilitate the joining of the two states.

Though not as likely a scenario as the previously mentioned ones, this scenario remains a possibility. For one, this is the way that East Germany and the Soviet Union chose to unshackle themselves from Communism. Nobody prior to its collapse foretold the sudden, passive surrender of Communism in the Soviet Union. This could very well be the case in North Korea. Also, many observers note that North Korea is already on the verge of collapse. It might be easier for Kim Jong Il to surrender than to try to implement reforms or save his regime.

In this scenario the voluntary collapse of the regime is sudden and unexpected. It is followed most likely by a period of chaos, where refugees and unemployed people by the hundreds of thousands would be displaced. In such distress, the church could play an instrumental role in bringing order to society through relief and humanitarian efforts. The door to North Korea missions would also likely be opened, though it is unclear how much freedom missionaries will have in their activities in the North. It is clear that the more prepared North Korea mission efforts are, the greater influence they will have during this time.

5. The Challenge of Timing and North Korea Missions

The unpredictability surrounding North Korea presents unique challenges for mission endeavors. First, not being able to predict when North Korea will open up to missions makes it difficult to mobilize people. Most people find it easier to wait until after North Korea opens up to start any action. Second, the many possible outcomes of North Korea in the near and far future make it difficult for mission agencies to agree on methods and vision. Can we form a strategy that comprehensively considers all likely scenarios of the North Korea regime, and plans accordingly to meet all the needs? How are current mission agencies approaching mission work in North Korea? Is it possible to implement a strategy for a church planting movement in North Korea? These are the questions we now need to examine.

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